

# THE APHORISMS OF THE MIMANSA PHILOSOPHY BY JAIMINI

---

Jaimini







THE APHORISMS  
OF THE  
MÍMÁNSÁ PHILOSOPHY  
BY  
JAIMINI.  
WITH  
EXTRACTS FROM THE COMMENTARIES.

---

IN SANSKRIT AND ENGLISH.

---



---

Printed for the use of the Benares College,  
by order of Govt., N. W. P.

---




---

ALLAHABAD:

PRINTED AT THE PRESBYTERIAN MISSION PRESS,  
Rev. JES. WARRON, *Superintendent*.  
1851.

THE APHORISMS  
OF  
THE MĪMÁNSĀ.

SANSKRIT AND ENGLISH.

PART I.

## PREFACE.

—\*—\*—

The great body of *Hindū Philosophy* is based upon six sets of very concise Aphorisms. Without a commentary the Aphorisms are scarcely intelligible, they being designed not so much to communicate the doctrine of the particular school, as to aid, by the briefest possible suggestions, the memory of him to whom the doctrine shall have been already communicated. To this end they are admirably adapted; and, this being their end, the obscurity, which must needs attach to them in the eyes of the un-instructed, is not chargeable upon them as a fault.

For various reasons it is desirable that there should be an accurate translation of the Aphorisms, with so much of gloss as may be required to render them intelligible. A class of pundits, in the *Benzars Sanskrit College*, having been induced to learn English, it is contemplated that a version of the Aphorisms, brought out in successive portions, shall be submitted to the criticism of these men, and, through them, of other learned *Brahmins*, so that any errors in the version may have the best chance of being discovered and rectified. The employment of such a version as a class-book is designed to subserve further the attempt to determine accurately the import of the philosophical terminology of the *East* as regards that of the *West*.

J. R. B.

*Benzars College,*

31st July, 1851.

}

# THE MĪMĀNSĀ APHORISMS.

## INTRODUCTION.

a. SALUTATION to the feet of the venerable preceptor !\*

b. Veneration unceasingly be to Jaimini, who removes the defect of vision of the simple by the calligraphy-needle of his Institutes which put an end to doubt as to the sense of scripture.†

c. Now a doubt being started as to whether or not Jaimini ought to have undertaken this work, which consists of twelve lectures,—and the *prima facie* solution of the doubt being as follows—viz.—such a work of disquisition ought not to be undertaken, because a work of disquisition is of no use when Heaven (*swarga*) is obtained by the mere taking of the letters [of the *Feet* without regard to its sense], Heaven alone being [in this case] to be supposed the fruit, as it is in the case of the sacrifice called *atithi* [—mentioned in the 4th canto of the *Ṛgveda*—], it being to be expected that there is some fruit attached

---

\* श्री गुरुभ्यो नमः ॥

† वेदार्थसंशयच्छेदशक्तान्नमश्चाकया । मूढचक्षुर्नद-  
च्छेदे नमो जैमिनये ऽनिघम् ॥

to the person engaged in the direction 'The Veda is to be pursued' [—and *Bravma* being most probably the fruit when no other fruit is specified;—well, this *prima facie* solution of the doubt having presented itself,] he declares the established tenet\* (in regard to the point, as follows).

## BOOK I. CHAPTER I.

### SECTION 1.

Or Derr.

अथातो धर्मविज्ञप्ता ॥ १ ॥

*The subject per-  
posed.*

Aph. 1.—Next, therefore, [O student] that hast attained thus far] a desire to know Duty (*dharma*) [is to be entertained by thee].

a. 'Next'—4. v. after pursuing the scriptures whilst residing with the family of a preceptor.]

ā. 'Therefore'—4. v. because the fruit of the pursuit of the scriptures is the knowledge of the sense [of its several passages,

\* अथ दाहशाध्यायात्मकं काकमरुत्तमीयं लभेति संशयः ।  
शाध्यायो ऽधेतव्य इति विहितश्रवणसा कलाकल्लवर्णा विष-  
यिज्ञायेन सुखे एव फलं कल्प्यं । तथापाद्यरश्मयमात्रेण  
सुखेऽपि विचारयाम्यस्याकिञ्चिद्व्यवस्थात् विचारयाम्यं मार-  
म्यमीयमिति पूर्वपक्षे सिद्धान्तमाह ।

† अथेति । अथ गुरुकुलवासपूर्वकमेवाध्यायनानन्तरम् ।



without comprehensive apprehension of the import of its teachings—see *Lecture on the Vedānta* [8]; therefore, in respect of Duty, the definition of which will be stated [in *Apk.* 2.], “a desire to know”—i. e. an investigation originating in a desire of knowledge—is to be made;—such is the remainder\* [required to supply the ellipse in the sphaerical].

c. The state of the case is this, that naturally the work of disquisition ought to be undertaken, because such a work of disquisition is just subverted by [or has a foundation laid for it in] that knowledge of the senses [of the several passages of scripture, that may be attained by a perusal thereof], and because it is fit that what is collected by a perusal thereof should be a correct understanding of the sense thereof [—instead of *Heaven's* being attained thereby, as supposed by the speaker in *Intro. c.*] seeing that it is improper to imagine an unseen reward [of this or that action] when a visible reward is possible;† [—and the understanding of the sense of scripture is a manifest reward of its perusal, whilst the attainment of *Heaven* by the perusal of scripture is what no one can declare that he has ever found manifested by the senses].

d. As the question will occur—“What is the Duty spoken of, in the expression ‘a desire to know Duty’, in the preceding

\* आतः । यतो ऽध्ययनस्य कृतमर्थज्ञानं । अतो धर्मस्य वक्ष्यमाणवचनस्य निश्चया । ज्ञानेश्चावाप्तौ विचारः । कर्मज्येति शेषः ।

† अर्थस्वाप्तः । सम्भवति दृष्टव्ये दृष्टव्यमवश्यमनुचितमित्यध्ययनेन तदर्थमिदयमव्यादनस्यैव विचारदर्शज्ञानस्य विचारमात्राधीनत्वादिह विचारमात्रमवश्यमारम्भणीयमिति ।

apophorem?<sup>1</sup>—in order to acquaint us with the nature of Duty, he mentions its characteristic mark as follows.\*

बोधनालक्षणे ऽपि धर्मः ॥ १ ॥

*How Duty is to be recognised.* ApA. 2.—A matter that is a Duty is recognised by the instigatory character [of the passage of scripture in which it is mentioned].

a. 'Instigatory character' [of the passage] :—this means [that the criterion of Duty is] an expression that moves [or instigates] one [to do so and so].

ā. 'Is recognised'—i. e. is known thereby ;—as fire is recognised by smoke, so that the smoke is the mark whereby fire [though unseen] is known [to be present where the smoke takes its rise] ; in like manner an instigatory form of expression is the mark by which we recognise Duty. So Duty is that, the criterion, or the instrument [in the determination], of which, is an instigatory form of expression.†

*What essentially constitutes Duty.* c. And what constitutes any thing such a matter [i. e. a matter that is fit to be urged in

\* पूर्वज्ञाने धर्मजिज्ञासेत्यत्र को धर्म इति जिज्ञासायां धर्मलक्षणाप्रधाना लक्षणायाः ।

† बोधनेति प्रवर्धकशब्दान् ।

‡ लक्षणे ज्ञाते ज्ञानेनेति लक्षणां । यथा धूमेनवह्निर्लक्षणे इति वह्निज्ञाने लक्षणाभूतः । तदन् धर्मज्ञाने लक्षणां बोधना । इत्यथ बोधनैव लक्षणां करणां यत्नः ।

encompass as a Duty] is the fact of its not producing more pain than pleasure\* [—i. e. its being calculated to produce more pleasure than pain].

d. And by this [mention, Aph. 3, of the mark whereby Duty is to be recognised], it is necessarily suggested that a Duty is not to be apprehended by the senses or by any thing else besides the instigatory character [of a passage in scripture].

e. But now [some one may ask], "Since, according to [the lexicon called] the *Māhāt Kāśa*, 'The word *dharma* should be masculine when it means work, but when it means sacrifices, &c., it is held to be neuter,' how is the word *dharma* masculine in the aphorism where it means the *Agnihotra* sacrifice and others [which are recognised as matters of Duty by the instigating promises attached to their performance]?"—If you ask this,—then take [and be content with] as the reason thereof the fact that he [JANAKI] is a great sanctified sage† [—and therefore entitled to give the word what gender he pleases. Conf. the *Yāgyavalkya Aphorisms* No. 7. 5].

f. In the foregoing aphorism [38.] it was intimated that the cause of [our correctly recognising] a Duty was simply an insti-

\* अर्थवच्च गुणाधिकदुःखाजनकत्वम् ॥

† This definition of *dharma* may be compared with the *Burmahese* definition of the *Uchit* :

‡ एतेन वेदवातिरिक्तेन्द्रियादिगम्यत्वं धर्मस्य नेत्यपि सूचितम् ॥

§ ननु । अहरे पुंनि धर्मः स्यात् स्त्रीने यागादिके मत इति नेदिनीहोशम् । अग्निहोत्रादिवाचकधर्मैश्च ननु स्रुचै पुंस्त्वं कथमिति वेदार्थत्वमेव वीजमिति सूचयत् ॥

gation (in the shape of a passage of scripture holding out a reward for its performance), but not any other evidence such as that of the senses, &c. Since it is impossible that the doubt, as to whether other evidences do enter into the case or not, should be removed without examination, he proposes the examination thereof\* (as follows).

## तस्य निमित्तपरीष्टिः । ३ ।

*The definition of Aph. 3.—An examination of the cause of [our Duty demanded].* *Aph. 3.—An examination of the cause of [our recognizing] it [—viz. Duty,—is to be made.]*

a. 'Of it',—i. e. of a knowledge of the truth—the object (in respect of which that knowledge is wanted) being Duty. 'The cause',—i. e. the means. 'An examination' thereof,—i. e. a discussion, a disputation, through decisive confutations [of the opposite opinion—see the Nyaya Aphorisms No. 39—] preceded by arguments [in support of the position laid down:—such an examination] is to be made:—such is the remainder† (required to supply the ellipsis in the aphorism).

4. [In the following aphorism] he explains the assertion that he made\* [in Aph. 3].

\* धर्मं बोद्धुमैव निमित्तं ननु प्रत्यक्षादीतरप्रमाणापीति पूर्वशब्देन ज्ञापितं । इतरप्रमाणानि तत्र प्रसरन्ति नवेति संशयस्य परीक्षामन्तरा निवृत्त्यवस्थानां तत्परीक्षां प्रति-  
जानीते ।

† तस्येति । तस्य धर्मविषयकतत्त्वज्ञानस्य । निमित्तं ।  
कारणं । तस्य परीष्टिः । परीक्षा । युक्तिपूर्वकसाधकतर्क-  
विचारः । कर्तव्येति शेषः ।

## सत्त्वसम्प्रयोगे पुरुषस्येन्द्रियाणां बुद्धिजगत् तत्त्वव्यवस्थानि मिथं विद्यमानोपलभ्यन्ताम् । ३ ।

*Duty not an object of sense-perception.* **Apk. 4.** When a man's organs of sense are rightly applied to something external, that birth of knowledge (which then takes place) is Perception,—(and this Perception is) not the means (of our recognising Duty—see § 3—) because [the organs of sense are adapted only to] the apprehension of what is [then and there] existent [—which an act of Duty is not.]

a. 'When rightly applied to something external' &c. (That is to say)—when a man's organs of sense are 'rightly applied to', or 'brought into contact with, 'something external', i. e. some object [then and there] existing, what 'birth of knowledge', or of intellection, takes place, is [what we call] Perception :—and each Perception is 'not the means', i. e. not the producer, of a knowledge of Duty :—that is to say—the organs of sense, which are the means of arriving at the truths of perception, do not (of themselves) enable us to arrive at the truth in respect of Duty.†

b. Of this [—viz. that the senses are not the means of our discerning Duty—] he mentions the reason [—when he says—in § 3—] 'because the apprehension of what is existent'; that is to

\* प्रतिज्ञातमेवार्थं विशदयति ।

† सत्त्वसम्प्रयोगे इति । पुरुषेन्द्रियाणां । जनिः । विशद-  
माने विषये । सम्प्रयोगे । संबोधे सति । यत् बुध्यते ।  
ज्ञानम् । जगत् तत्त्वव्यवस्थं । ईदृशं प्रत्यक्षं धर्मज्ञानं जनि-  
मिथं । नोपादत्तं । प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणाधनीभूतासीन्निराक्षि धर्म-  
प्रमां न साधयसीति भावः ।

say—because, by means of the organs of sense there is the apprehension of 'what is existent', i. e. of some thing (then and there) present;—and since Duty [—in the shape, suppose, of the performance of sacrifice—] is not present at the time of our knowing it [to be a Duty to perform the sacrifice,—] it is not adapted to the organs of sense.\*

*Not being an object of sense-perception, Duty is not to be recognised by inference from such perception.*

c. From its being disproved that the senses are the cause thereof [i. e. of our discerning Duty—] it is to be understood as also disproved that Inference, or Analogy, or Conjecture [see Wilson's *Siddhya Kārikā* p. 21.—] which owe their birth thereto—having their root in Perception—can be the cause thereof. Therefore it is a settled point that the characteristic of Duty [—or that whereby we are to recognise it— as declared in *Aph. 2.*—] is the indignant† (of the passage in scripture where some act is mentioned as being calculated to lead to such and such consequences).

*The doubt whether the evidence in favour of a Duty may not be fallacious as is that of the senses.*

d. But then, an objector may urge,] —"after words and meanings have presented themselves, since the connection between the two is one derived by man—existing, as it does, of the construction which man has devised,—therefore, as human knowledge wanders away from truth in respect of another of

\* तत्र हेतुमाह । विद्यमानोपपत्त्यात् । विद्यमानस्य ।  
वर्तमानस्यैव वस्तुना । इन्द्रियैरुपपत्त्यात् । धर्मस्यैव ज्ञान-  
क्षान्ते कल्पनेन इन्द्रियायोग्यादिति भावः ।

† इन्द्रियाद्यान्निमित्तजनिरसनेन ज्ञाप्यमानमूलक-  
व्याप्तिज्ञानसाहचर्यार्थापत्तीनां तद्विनिमित्तत्वं निरस्यमवगम्यते ।  
कृतयोदनामात्रगम्यत्वं धर्मज्ञश्चमिति सिद्धम् ।

pearl as the like [when it mistakes them for silver or the like], as since language, as it is dependent on man inasmuch as it has reference to the knowledge of a connection which was devised by man, is liable to part company with veracity in matters of declaration, the indicative nature [of a passage which, being in words, is liable to be misunderstood,] cannot be the instrument of correct knowledge in respect of Duty\*—well, this *prima facie* view of the matter having presented itself, he declares the established doctrine as follows,†

कौत्सनिबन्धं शब्दसाम्येन सम्यग्बन्धस्य ज्ञानमुपदेष्टो  
 ऽव्यतिरेककार्येऽनुपपन्नस्यै तत्प्रमाणं वादरायणस्यानपे-  
 क्षत्वात् ॥ ५ ॥

*Reply*—that this  
 should show not only  
 first, the evidence of  
 Scripture.

*Aph. 5.*—But the natural connection of a word with its sense is [the instrument of] the knowledge thereof, [i. e. of Duty], and the intimation [of Scripture which is] unerring though given in respect of something imperceptible. This [according to our opinion as well as that] of Bāṇadāyana [the author of the Vedānta Aphorisms] is the evidence [by means of which we recognize Duty], for it has no respect [to any other evidence—such as that of sense].

a. \* Of a word;—i. e. of an expression that is a constituent

\* शब्दार्थसाम्यपक्षेनानर्हं पुरुषेषु कल्पितसङ्केतात्मक-  
 सम्यग्बन्धस्य कल्पितत्वात्पुरुषकल्पितसम्यग्बन्धानापेक्षत्वाच्च-  
 न्मस्य यथा प्रत्यक्षज्ञानं शुक्तिकादौ साधनं व्यभिचरति तथा  
 पुरुषार्थानुसारेण ज्ञानेऽपि सत्यावयवविचारसम्भवाच्च भ्रमे  
 बोधना प्रमाणमिति पूर्वपक्षे सिद्धान्तमाह ॥

part of the everlasting Veda ;—such as—“ He that denoteth Paradise should solemnise the *Agastya* sacrifice,” &c.\*

b. ‘With its sense’—i. e. with the meaning which is to be conveyed by this or that† [word].

c. ‘Connection’—in the shape of power‡ (or of God’s will that this or that word should convey this or that meaning).

d. ‘Natural’—i. e. inherent,—in short, eternal§.

e. Thence [i. e. from the eternal connection of a word with its sense] is the knowledge ‘thereof’—i. e. of Duty. Here [i. e. in the word *jñāna*] the affix *jñā* conveys the force of the ‘instrument’,—so, that the word signifies the instrument of knowledge or of right understanding.]

*An objection, founded on the impossibility of verification in the case intended.*

f. But then [some one may ask]—“ since it is notorious in the world that, after hearing the expression ‘It [—e. g. a mountain—] is fiery’,—having seen, with the organ of sense, the fire [asserted to be, e. g., in the mountain], one then admits [—what one was not prepared to admit before subjecting the matter, on some occasion or other, to the test of the senses]—that matter of testimony is [or may be] matter of right knowledge

\* गन्धस्य । निव्यवेदघटकपदस्य । अग्निदोषं जुहुयात्तन्मयै-  
कान्म इत्यादिः ॥

† अर्थेन । तत्तत्प्रतिपाद्यार्थेन ॥

‡ सम्बन्धः । शक्तिरूपः ॥

§ सौम्यनिकः । सभायिकः । निय इति यावत् ॥

॥ अतश्चस्य । धर्मस्य । ज्ञानं । ज्ञान करणे ल्युट् ।  
अत्रैर्येयार्थज्ञानस्य करणम् ॥



[—or, in other words, that Testimony may be relied on, seeing that we have found it corroborated by the evidence of the senses—] ; since [we say] what is conveyed by *Hears* [or Testimony] has need of other evidence, such as the senses, how can it be this to which we owe our right knowledge of Duty ?—It is with an eye to this [anticipated objection] that he says, [in the Aphorism, that the testimony is here the evidence] ‘in respect of something *super-sensible*’, meaning thereby [that Duty is] something not to be apprehended by means of the senses or any other evidence\* [apart from that specified in §2].

g. ‘*Estimation*’—i. e. declaration of a fact.†

A. ‘*Unerring*’—i. e. which is not seen to diverge therefrom‡ [i. e. from the fact].

i. ‘*For it has no respect*’—i. e. because it has no reference to sense-perception, &c.‡

j. ‘*This*’—i. e. a sentence consisting of an injunction—is the evidence [on which rests our knowledge] of Duty ;—such is the consistent opinion of *śāstraśāstra*.§ The *drśā* [of what we

\* ननु वक्षिष्यामिति शब्दव्यवधानकरं प्रत्यक्षेण वक्षिं दद्वा  
शब्दे प्रमात्रं दृष्टातीति श्लोके प्रसिद्धेः प्रापचादीतरप्रमात्र-  
सापेक्षत्वाच्छब्दश्च स कथं धर्मं प्रमात्रगतं वाह्यं अनुपपन्नं  
इति । अनुपपत्त्यै । प्रापचादिप्रमात्रैरशाने ऽर्थे ।

† उपदेशः । अर्थप्रतिपादनम् ।

‡ अस्यतिरेकः । अस्यभिचारी दृश्यते अतः ।

§ अनपेक्षत्वात् । प्रापचाद्यनपेक्षत्वात् ।

[ The mention of the name of *śāstraśāstra* (or *śāstra*) in the Aphorism goes to prove that RAJENDRA'S work, the *pratyakṣa-sūtra*, was not unknown to him :—*śāstra*, the author of the *śāstra-sūtra*. Mr. Colebrooke's rendering of the terms *pratyakṣa* and *śāstra* by “*proof*” and “*law*” (—see *Asiatica*, vol. 1, pp. 237 and 238—) would seem to have led Dr. Ritter to suppose that

have been arguing] is this. The sentence "The mountain is fiery", when employed by a man who is defective [in some of his organs of sense], wanders away from the fact [—for the mountain may seem to such a man to be fiery when it really is not—]; therefore we require to make use of our senses to ascertain whether credence is due [to the testimony of fallible man]:—but the injunction "He that desireth Paradise should forsake the *Agni-hotra* sacrifice" never at any time past present or future is liable thus to wander from the truth; therefore is it, independently of any thing else, the clear evidence of a duty.\*

## SECTION II.

### ON THE ETERNITY OF SOUND.

The stability of  
Scripture implies the  
eternity of Sound.

A. It was stated in the foregoing Aphorism [No. 5] that the connection between a word and its sense is eternal [—see § 8 A.]; and since this is dependant on the eternity of Sound [—seeing that if Sound were not eternal, then words formed of sound could not

SAIDYAT'S system was the earlier in point of time. He says, (in p. 316, vol. IV. of his *History of Philosophy*,—Harrison's version—) that "according to Calaneo, the adherents of that school may be divided into the earlier and the later",—and then he goes on to speak of "the older and genuine Vedānta"—but as both the terms "prior" and "later" refer to the divisions of the Veda which Jaimini and Yāska, respectively expounded, the latter continuing himself to the Sūphikāśi, or theological sections, which stand last in order.

= तत् । विभिन्नवृत्तवाक्यैः । धर्मे प्रमाद्यं वाहराद्यथा  
वाक्यैश्च सत्यम् । अथमाद्यः । पर्वतो बह्निमानिति दोष-  
कपुरुषप्रयुक्तं वाक्यं यानि व्यभिचरति । अतः प्रमाद्य-  
निवृत्तये अथवाहिकमपेक्षते । तथा द्विहोत्रं बहुहोतीति  
वाक्यं कालवृत्तौ प्रयुक्तं न व्यभिचरति । अत इतरनिरपेक्षं  
धर्मे प्रमाद्यमिति ।

be eternal, nor consequently the relation of each to their significations—], he, seeking to demonstrate this, sets forth, in the first place, the principal facts view of the question in the shape of the opinion of those who assert that Sound is not eternal.\*

### कर्मके तत्र दर्शनात् ॥ ६ ॥

*First objection to the eternity of Sound, that it is a product.*      *Apk. 6.—Some say that it [viz. Sound] is a product, for in the case of it we see [what contributes to each]*

a. 'Some say that it is a product, &c'—'Some'—i. e. the followers of the Nyāya—say that Sound is a 'product',—i. e. something not eternal; 'for we see'—i. e. we see an effort made; 'in the case of it'—i. e. in the case of Sound; and it is a rule without exception that that is not eternal which effort is concerned in [the existence of] †

b. Moreover [the Nyāyikas contend that Sound is not eternal for the following reasons]:—

### शब्दानात् ॥ ७ ॥

*Second objection, that it is transitory.*      *Apk. 7.—Because of its transitoriness.*

\* पूर्वसूत्रे शब्दार्थयोस्तन्मयो नित्यं दधुर्गम् । तत्र शब्द नित्यत्वाधीनमिति तद्विशेषाद्विधुरादौ शब्दानित्यत्ववादिमतं पूर्वपक्षमुपादयति ॥

† कर्मणि । शब्दे । नैष्ठाधिकारः । कर्म अनित्यं शब्दं वदन्ति । तत्र । शब्दविषये । दर्शनात् । प्रयत्नदर्शनात् । यद्विषयः प्रयत्नः सोऽनित्य इति व्याप्तेः ।

‡ विश्वम् ॥

a. 'Because of its transitoriness'—i. e. because it is not permanent;—or in other words, because, beyond a moment, it is no longer perceived.\*

β. Moreover [the Nalopāṇiśa contend that Sound is not eternal for the following reason].

### करोतिशब्दान् । ८ ।

*Third objection, that Sound is created as fastness by the usage of language.*

*Apā. 8.—Because [we employ, when speaking of Sound,] the expression 'making.'*

a. That is to say—because we treat it as something not eternal, inasmuch as we talk of making a sound, just as we talk of making a jar.†

β. And for the following reason also, he mentions, they hold it to be not eternal.‡

*Fourth objection, that the alleged agency of Sound is incompatible with its undivided nature.*

### सत्त्वानरे यैत्यवदन् । ९ ।

*Apā. 9.—From its simultaneity in another person.*

a. [To complete the sentence] it is necessary to supply 'in another place', when we speak of 'another person'.—so then, we observe 'simultaneity', i. e. the fact of belonging to one and the same time,—'in another being'—i. e. in the perception of [Sound by] another living creature occupying a different place.¶

\* अक्षानादक्षिरत्नात् । अथाहूर्ध्वमनुपपद्येति भावः ।

† किञ्च ।

‡ यथा घटं करोतीति तथा शब्दं करोतीत्यनित्यत्वञ्चकारात् ॥

§ इतो ऽप्यनित्य इत्याह ॥

॥ सत्त्वानर इति । हेवान्तर इत्यपि पुरचीर्षं । यथा ।

b. The scope [of the objection] is this, viz., the unity of Sound will follow from the very same argument by which, for shortness, its eternity will be established [by the followers of the Mīmāṃsā, —supposing the argument to be admitted]; and thus one [numerically single] thing would be simultaneously perceived by [and hence simultaneously in immediate contact —see Nyāya Aphorisms, No. 4—with the sense-organs of] those both near and far;—and this could not be if it were [numerically] one and eternal;—therefore [the Nyāyikas conclude] Sound is not eternal and it is plural.\*

c. And for the following reason too [according to the Nyāyikas] it is so [—that Sound is not eternal—], as the author mentions it†:—

### प्रकृतिविकृतयोश्च । १० ।

*Fifth objection, that sounds are liable to phenomenal variation.*

*ApA. 10.*—And [the Nyāyikas infer that Sound is not eternal, from the observation] of the original and altered forms [of sounds].

a. What is meant is this,—because it holds universally that that is not eternal the previous condition of which undergoes a change; and in the example designated [i. e. 'walk—here']

देशान्तरे । अन्यदेशस्तुल्यस्थान्तरे । प्राणान्तरप्राप्यथे । यौग-  
वदमेककाचित्कृतं दृष्टम् ।

\* अयमाशयः । यथा जायमान्निवृत्त्यं तथा तेनैव हेतुना  
यम् एकत्वमपि सेव्यते । इत्यन्वैकस्य यस्तु नस्त निरुपविप्र-  
कृतप्रत्यक्षं युगपद्भवेत् । इदमेकत्वे निमित्ते ऽनुपपन्नं । अतो  
ऽनित्यः शब्दो नामाचेति ।

† इतो ऽपि तथेत्याह ।

where the original form was double *stra*, there is a change in the shape of the letter *p* in the room of the original letter *k*.\*

## इदं कर्तृभूत्वाह । ११ ।

*Such a signification, that Sound grows the greater when more are engaged in making it.*

*Aph. 11.—And, by a multitude of makers, there is an augmentation of it.*

*a.* For this reason too, it [viz. Sound] is not eternal, that 'an augmentation', i. e. an increase, 'of it', i. e. of Sound, is observed [to be caused], 'by a multitude of makers', i. e. by the concurrence of those who make it. On the other hand, if you assume that human effort is [not the maker but only] the manifestor of Sound, [—as a lamp is not the maker of a jar but the manifestor of it—making cognisable the jar which previously existed unperceived—then we reply, that,] what is manifested is not seen to be made greater even by a thousand manifestors, as a jar is not made larger by a thousand lamps, [and Sound is made greater by a multitude], therefore [say the Nyāyikas] the alternative supposition of 'manifestation' [instead of production] will not answer :—such is the import.†

\* दृश्यतेष्वहं इति शब्देति प्रकृतिस्थितौ प्रकृतिभूतेकार-  
णान्ने सकारकपो विचारो भवति । यथाः प्रकृतेर्विकारस्यो  
ऽनित्य इति व्यतिरेरिति भावः ।

† कर्तृभूत्वा । कर्तृवाक्येन । अथ । अदृश्य । इति ।  
महत्त्वं दृश्यते अतो ऽनित्यः । दृश्यप्रत्यक्षस्य अदृश्यस्य  
कल्पयते व्यक्ताकल्पयतेष्वपि व्यक्तस्य इतिर्न दृश्यते । यथा  
दीपमहत्तेष्वपि चक्षुः । अतो व्यक्ताकल्पयतो ऽप्युक्त इति  
भावः ॥

The solution of these objections is undertaken.

4. The several objections thus alleged against the 'manifestation' view [of Sound's coming to be perceived], he proceeds to refute in their order.\*

### समस्तु तत्र दर्शयन् ॥ ११ ॥

Ap1. 12.—But alike (according to both opinions—that of these objectors and of ourselves) is the perception thereof—[both agreeing that this is only for a moment, whatever difference of opinion there may be as to Sound itself's being so.]

a. 'But alike &c.' There requires to be supplied [to complete the aphorism] 'for a moment' and 'according to both opinions.' According to both opinions,—i. e. according to the opinion that it is produced and the opinion that it is manifested,—'alike,' i. e. without dispute, 'the perception,' i. e. sensation of Sound, is for a moment, i. e. only for a moment.†

6. Though [so far as this point is concerned] they are alike, yet which of the views is the best? To this question the reply is that the 'manifestation' view is the proper one; so he proceeds to say as follows.‡

\* एवं व्यञ्जकत्वापत्तेः कदाचिद्व्यञ्जकानुष्ठानानि कस्मैश्च परित्यज्यमुपपन्नमते ।

† सममिति । अथमिति मतद्वय इति च पूरणीयं । मतद्वये । अथमतेऽव्ययत इति मतद्वये । अर्थः । अथमात्रं । दर्शयन् । शब्दप्रत्ययं । समं । अविवादम् ॥

‡ समाने ऽपि कालमः पक्षो परित्यक्त इति प्रष्टे व्यञ्जकत्वापत्तेः युक्त इत्याह ।

## सतः परमदृश्येन विद्यमानावमात् ॥ १. ६ ॥

*How Sound exists even  
when not manifested.*

*Aph. 12.*—Of this [Sound] while it really exists, the non-perception at another time [than that when the sound is perceived]

arises from the non-arrival of the manifestor at the object.

a. 'Of this while it really exists' *sa.* 'While it really exists,'  
—i. e. which is at all times extant (whether perceived or not); —  
'at another time,' i. e. at a time before or after; 'the non-per-  
ception,' i. e. the absence of perception, [arises] from non-arrival  
of the efficient manifestor at 'the object,' i. e. at the Sound.\*

b. The import is as follows. Sound is eternal, (as we are con-  
strained to admit) by force of the recognition that 'This is that  
same letter K' (—viz. the same Sound that I heard yesterday or  
fifty years ago—, and I recognise it as I might recognise a peak  
of the parental Himalaya which I do not suppose to cease to  
exist when I turn away my eyes from it—), and in virtue of the  
*law of parsimony*† [one of the fundamental laws of philosophising  
acknowledged by philosophers both of the East and of the West,  
and implying that we must never assume more causes of a given  
effect than are sufficient to account for it].

\* सत इति । सतः । सर्वदा विद्यमानम् । परं । पूर्वो-  
त्तरकाले । अदृश्येन । प्रत्यक्षभावः । संस्तुतेऽदृश्यकस्य विषयं  
चर्च्य प्रत्यमानमात् ।

† अर्थ भावः । स एवायं कक्षार इति प्रत्यभिज्ञानात् ।  
आद्यवाच्य । चर्चो निवृत्तः ।

† In opposition to the Maximilian, the Nāgārjūna contend that the form  
of expression 'This is that same letter K' is grounded merely on the fact that  
the things referred to are of the same kind,—just as in the case with the sa-



c. The conjunctions and disjunctions [*—or undulations—*] of the air issuing from the mouth [of him who speaks or shouts] remove the *stiff* air\* which was the obstacle to the perception of Sound, and thence it becomes perceptible:—such is the reply to the objection [recorded in Aph. 7] of its ‘transformation.’†

d. His next reply to the objection [recorded in Aph. 8] that we use the expression ‘making’ [in regard to Sound]:—

### प्रयोगस्य परम् । १, ४ ॥

Aph. 14.—This [expression ‘making’] means [namely] *employing*.  
 When we say we ‘make’ a sound, we ought to mean that we ‘employ’ a sound.

e. In regard to Sound, when we speak of ‘making,’ the word ‘making’ means, or imports, ‘employing,’ i. e. uttering.‡

question ‘He has taken the same medicine that I did.’ See the *Śaṅkara Mātṛaṇī* p. 153. Compare also the remarks of Whately on the ambiguity of the word ‘same,’ quoted at p. 22 of our ‘Introduction to the Indian Philosophy.’

\* Europeans hold that Sound is due to vibration. Jidduka admits that it is not perceived when there is no vibration, but he argues that the absence of vibration, or the stiffness of the air, is what prevents us from perceiving the sound which never ceases to exist, whether perceived or not.

† सुषोद्धमवायुसंघोषविभागाः शब्दप्राप्यपतित्वात्कीभू-  
 तस्मिन्नितावायुन्दूरीकृत्यैभिः । ततः प्रत्यक्षमिति वाच्यानादि-  
 त्वस्योत्तरम् ॥

‡ करोतिशब्दादित्यस्योत्तरमाह ।

§ प्रतिशब्दं करोतीत्यत्र करोतिपदं प्रयोगस्य । उच्चारणस्य । परं । तात्पर्यकम् ॥

4. He next replies to the objection (recorded in Aph. 9) that Sound is heard simultaneously by different individuals.\*

### आदित्यवद्योगपक्षम् ॥ १५ ॥

*As the sun is seen by many eyes, so is the sound heard by many ears, so in the case of the sun.* Aph. 15.—The simultaneity is as

a. 'As in the case of the sun'—that is to say,—as the Sun, which is but one, is seen simultaneously by those stationed in different places, so, like the sun, Sound is a great object, not a minute one† (such as cannot come at once under the inspection of persons at any distance from one another.)

4. He next replies to the objection (recorded in Aph. 10) respecting the original and altered forms of sounds.‡

### वर्धोत्तरमधिकारः ॥ १६ ॥

*Letters are exchanged, not transformed.* Aph. 16.—This (via the letter y—referred to in Aph. 10—when it comes in the room of the letter i) is another letter, not a modification (of that whose place it takes).

a. 'Another letter' &c. That is to say,—in the room of the letter i is another letter—another sound—a different sound in short. It is not a modification of the letter i as a mat is a modification of the straw (out of which it is formed). If it were so, then, as the maker of a mat is under the necessity of providing himself with straw, the man that employs the letter y would be under the necessity of taking the letter i‡ [to make the y out

---

\* अक्षरान्तरे धौमपक्षादित्यसौत्तरमाह ।

† आदित्यवदिति । यथा एकः सूर्यो नानादेशसौर्येण पदीक्ष्यते तथा आदित्यवन्द्वान् कन्दो न शक्य इति भावः ॥

‡ प्रकृतिविकृत्येत्येत्यसौत्तरमाह ।

§ वर्धोत्तरमिति इकारस्थाने वक्ताः वर्धोत्तरं । कन्दोत्तरं

of *y*—which is not the case, for one can use the letter *y* without any reference to the letter *i*).

b. He next replies to the objection [recorded in *Apā. 11*] that there is an augmentation\* [of the sound when the makers of it are numerous].

### नादहृदि परा । १.७ ।

*Increase of volume or  
increase of Sound.*

*Apā. 17.*—It is the increase of noise [not of sound] that is [in that case] augmented.

a. 'It is of noise,' &c. It is an error to say [as in *Apā. 11*] that it is an increase of sound that is 'augmented'—i. e. rendered greater†.

b. 'Increase of noise.' From many makers of drums, or pronouncers of articulate sounds, it is recognised [by the hearers] that 'There is a great sound.' In such a case it is impossible, according to the opinion of our opponents [the Nāyāyikas] to say that portions of Sound, being produced by each of the men [concerned in the making of the noise], produce a great bulk of Sound, like a bulk of cotton [formed out of portions of cotton aggregated], because Sound, according to those opponents, inasmuch as it is a quality, has no parts [or portions].

अन्यथाशब्द इति यावत् । न वकारस्य विचारकृषाणां कट इव । तथा सति कटकत्रौ नियमेन शब्दसंख्यादिवत् वकारं प्रयुञ्जच्चियमेनेकारमाहश्चादिति भावः ।

\* इतिशेषश्चोत्तरमाह ।

† नादेति । परा । अतिशयिता । शब्दहृदिरिति भ्रम-  
विषया ।

‡ नादहृदि । बहुभिर्भेरीधृदिः यथोक्तशब्दमुच्चार-

c. Therefore,—as there is no arriving [at an explanation otherwise],—when the conjunctions and disjunctions [occasioned by the vibration of the air] take place continually without intermission, arriving from all quarters at the entrance to the hollow of the ear, it [the Sound] seems to be great, and to be made up of parts. What is meant [in *Aph.* 17] by 'noise' is these conjunctions and disjunctions, and it is just of these that an accumulation takes place\* [when a multitude of persons is engaged in rendering Sound manifest].

d. Having thus removed the objections offered by others, he proceeds to state what will establish his own theory.†

### नित्यं स्याद्दर्शनस्य परार्थत्वात् ॥ १८ ॥

*Sound eternal, else it  
would not stand for  
communication.*

*Aph.* 18.—But it must be eternal, because its exhibition is [available—which it else would not be—]for the sake of another.

यद्विषयं महान् शब्द इत्युपलभ्यते । तत्र परमते प्रतिपुष्टं  
शब्दावयवा उत्पन्नास्तन्तुः तून्ने महत्त्ववच्छन्ने महत्त्वं सम्पाद-  
यतीति वक्तुमशक्यं । परमते शब्दस्य गुणत्वेन निरवयव-  
त्वात् ॥

\* चेतोऽतस्या कर्षणशक्तुलीनशब्दस्य सर्वतस्त्वरधिं व्यापु-  
वद्विः संयोगविभागेनैव रणार्थस्यासकृद्ब्रह्मवाक्यशानिवाक्यवा-  
निरूप प्रतीयते । संयोगविभागा नादपदेन वाचासौधमेव  
वद्विरिति भावः ॥

† एवं परप्रतिपादितब्रह्मवाक्यद्वय समते साधकं वक्तुं  
प्रभवते ॥

c. 'Eternal'—i. e. *sound* must be eternal. Its 'existence'—i. e. its utterance—[have denoted by the term] *derives* [from *shre* 'to see'] because Sound is perceived or becomes manifest thereby [i. e. by means of utterance]. 'Because for the sake of another'—i. e. because it is [available] to the end that another may understand our meaning. If it were not eternal, then, as it would not continue till the hearer had understood our meaning [—the perceived sound ceasing on the instant that it reaches the ear—], the understanding [of what was uttered] would not take place because of the absence of the cause :—such is the import.\* [The understanding of what is uttered must follow—at however short an interval—the perception of the sound uttered; and if the sound uttered perish on the hearing, then, being no longer in existence, it cannot be the cause of any thing. If, on the other hand, it continues to exist, for any period however short, after ceasing to be perceived,—it is impossible to assign any other instant at which there is any evidence of the discontinuance of its existence,—whence its eternity is inferred.]

d. Moreover [as Sound is prospectively eternal, so was it antecedently—for] :—

शब्देनैवावधारणम् ॥ १८ ॥

*Sound is eternal, because hearers simultaneously recognise a sound, which cannot therefore be a new production.*

Apk. 18.—[Sound is proved to be eternal] by there being everywhere simultaneousness [in the recognition of it by ever so many hearers].

\* नित्य इति शब्देनैवावधारणम् । दृश्यते व्यर्थेन शब्दे ज्ञेनेति दर्शनेननुधारणम् । तस्य परार्थत्वात् । शब्दस्यार्थप्रतिपत्त्यर्थत्वात् । अनित्यत्वे योतुरर्थप्रतिपत्तिवर्धनस्य तिष्ठतीति प्रतिपत्तिर्नैवात् कारणाभावादिनि भावः ॥

† किञ्च ॥

a. 'Every where':—say in the word *go*, simply, [—a single example of a word being sufficient as the representative of any or every word—]. 'By there being simultaneousness'—i. e. because there arises simultaneously [in the minds of a hundred or more persons, on hearing the word *go*—"a cow"]—a correct recognition. That "This [letter G, of the word *go*,] is that same letter G [that I have heard on an indefinite number of former occasions,]" is the recognition, simultaneously, of many persons; and a multitude of persons do not simultaneously fall into an error [—this being as unlikely as it is that a hundred arrows discharged simultaneously by a hundred archers should all by mistake hit the same object—]; such is the import.\*

b. When the word *go* "cow" has been pronounced ten times, one says "The word *go* has been pronounced ten times" but not "Ten words of the form *go* have been pronounced;" and he next declares that Sound is proved to be eternal by this fact alone†

### संख्याभावात् ॥ २० ॥

*Sound is eternal, because each sound is not numerically different from itself repeated.*

*Aph. 20.—(Sound is proved to be eternal) by the absence of Number.*

a. 'Of Number.'—i. e. because Number [which belongs to that which, being transitory, is succeeded by another of the same kind,] does not belong to Sound [—for the word *go*, heard ten

\* यथैव । गोशब्दनामे । यौगपद्यात् । अवाधितप्रति-  
ज्ञाया युगपदुत्पत्तेः । स इत्यर्थं गकार इति युगपदनेकेषां  
प्रत्यभिज्ञा भवति नान्यनेके युगपद्गुणा भवतीति भावः ॥

† दशशब्दो गोशब्दस्योच्चारणे दशवारमुच्चरितो गोशब्द-  
इत्येव वदति नतु दश गोशब्दा उच्चारिता इति । अतो ऽपि  
शब्दो नित्य इत्याह ॥

Sound once, is just the same word *ga*,—as remarked under Aph. 19. &.) This is plain.\*

4. And for the following reason too it is eternal, as he states it:—

### शब्दविद्यमान् । २१. ।

*Sound is eternal because  
indiscernible.*

Aph. 21.—[Sound is proved to be eternal]  
by there being no ground for anticipation  
[of its destruction].

a. That is to say, because we do not know any cause that should destroy Sound. To explain:—as, on the mere inspection of a web, for instance, one feels certain that—"This web was produced by the conjunction of threads, and it will be destroyed by the destruction of the conjunction of the threads,"—as, from our having no such certainty as to any cause that should lead to the destruction of Sound, we conclude that it is eternal; [—on the same principle that the immortality of the Soul has been argued from its indiscernibility].

b. But then [—some one may say—] "Sound is a modification of the air, since [—as you admit under Aph. 17.—] it

\* संस्येति । शब्दे संस्थाभावात् । स्पष्टम् ।

† इतोऽपि निवृत्त्यादः ।

‡ शब्दनाशकारणस्याज्ञानत्वादित्यर्थः । यथा पटादिद-  
र्शनमात्रेण पटोऽयमननुसंयोगजन्यमननुसंयोगनाशादिगच्छ-  
तीति निश्चिनोति तथा शब्दनाशकारणमिद्वधाभावाच्चित्त-  
इति भावः ।

arises from the conjunction thereof [with the organ of hearing];—and so too the *Śāhīd* [—that appendage to the Vedas which treats of pronunciation—] tells us “Air arrives at the state of being Sounded;”—and thus being a product of Air, it is not eternal.” This doubt having presented itself, he declares\* as follows:—

### प्रथमाभावाच्च योम्यस्य । २२ ।

*Sound not due to  
Air, because not im-  
possible.*

*Aph. 22.*—And [the case is not as the  
doubter under *Aph. 21.* suggests], because  
[if it were so] there would be no perception  
[by the organ of Hearing] of any object appropriate to it.

a. ‘Appropriate to it’—i. e. an object of the sensation that arises from the organ of Hearing,—viz., Sound:—‘because there would be no perception;’—i. e. by reason of our finding the absence of any perception;—because modifications of the *Air* are not what the organ of Hearing takes cognizance of,—Sound not being something tangible [as the Air is held by the *Naiyāyikas* to be, while Sounded they admit has an altogether different substance,—viz., the Ether—]; such is the import†

\* ननु शब्दो वायुविकारः । तदीयसंयोगैकत्ववत्त्वात् ।  
तथाच शिखा वायुरावृणते शब्दतानिति वायुशब्दभाव-  
नित्य इत्याशङ्क्याभावाच्च ।

† योम्यस्य । योगेन्द्रियजन्यप्रत्यक्षविवक्षया । शब्दस्य ।  
प्रथमाभावात् । प्रत्यक्षाभावाप्रसङ्गात् । वायुविकारस्य योगे-  
न्द्रियावाच्छ्रुतात् । शब्दस्याप्यसृष्टत्वाच्चेति भावः ।



## चिकुदर्शनाथ ॥ १३ ॥

*Sound is eternal, for this is implied in Scripture.* Aph. 23.—And [Sound is proved to be eternal] by our seeing a proof, [of this, in a text of the Scripture which will be cited in the commentary here following].

a. That is to say,—because we see a proof that language is eternal, in the following text—viz., “By language, that alters not, eternal,”\* &c.

â. And the truth is, that, although this declaration [—viz. the text just quoted—] was intended for another purpose [than to prove the eternity of Sound], still it does declare, incidentally, the eternity of language, and therefore Sound [without which it is impossible that language should be eternal] is eternal.†

c. Here ends the topic of Sound.‡

## SECTION III.

ON THE NATURE OF SOUNDS, &c.

d. Though thus Sound is eternal, as also the connection between Sound and sense, still, that an indignation in the shape

\* वाचा चिकुपनित्यमेति मन्त्रे नित्यया वाचेति चिकुदर्शनादित्यर्थः ।

† यदापीदमन्वावरं वाक्यं तथापि वाचो नित्यत्वमनुवदति तस्माच्चित्तरश्मि इति भावः ।

‡ यन्वाचिकरथं समाप्तम् ।

of a sentence is no proof of any thing's being a duty, he states (on behalf of an opponent, and therefore) ironically as follows :—

**उत्पत्तौ वा रचनाः स्वरूपज्ञाननिमित्तत्वात् ॥ २४ ॥**

*Objection that though Words may be eternally associated with their meanings, still this does not apply to Sentences.*

*Aph. 24.*—That [—viz. the knowledge of the meanings of words—] being by nature, still let these [—viz. the connections between sentences and their meanings—] be fortitious,—because the cause of [the knowledge of] the meaning [of the whole sentence] is not this [knowledge of the meanings of separate words].

a. 'This being by nature'—i. e., the fact that knowledge of the meanings of words is natural [and "as about eternal"—see *Aph. 5. d.*—] being granted,—still the connections between sentences and the meanings of the sentences are 'fortitious,'—i. e. are devised by man; because of its being 'not that,'—i. e. [because of its being] something *differed* from the knowledge of the meanings of the words, that is the 'cause,' or producer, *distant*,—viz. 'of the meaning,' i. e.—of the knowledge of the meaning of the sentence.†

b. For [—to explain—], the cause of a sentence is not barely

\* एवं शब्दस्य शब्दार्थशब्दभेदश्च निवृत्त्येऽपि वाक्यास्मि  
का चेदना न भवे प्रमाथमिवाधिपतिः ।

† उत्पत्ताविति । उत्पत्तौ । पदार्थज्ञानोत्पत्तौ सत्ता ।  
वाक्यवाक्यार्थयोस्तद्व्याः रचनाः । पुरुषकल्पिताः । स्मृः ।  
अर्थस्य । वाक्यार्थज्ञानस्य । ज्ञातम् । पदार्थज्ञानमिदम् ।  
निमित्तम् । कारणम् । यस्य । तत्त्वात् ।

the [aggregate of the separate] senses of its words. There is [—we will admit—] a connection between a word and its sense [—a connection, as remarked under Aph. 5. c., in the shape of power, or of God's will that this or that word should convey this or that meaning—]; but it is not the fact that the connection between a collection of words in the shape of a sentence, and the sense of that sentence, is in like manner that of power [—or of God's having pre-arranged that such and such groups of words should convey such and such a sense]; but the connection is quite a different one, and it is devised by man, and is artificial:—how then can such be our evidence for [—or the source of an absolutely correct knowledge of] Duty? Such is the import of the aphorism conveying the *primal* *fact* view.\*

c. He now declares the established view.†

तदुक्तानां कियार्थेन समान्वाये ऽप्येव तद्विनिष्-  
त्तात् ॥ २५ ॥

*Analysis of a  
Sentence.*

Aph. 25.—[In each proposition of Scripture there is seen] the connection, along with a word, of those [words] that are in it, because it is this [viz., the knowledge of the sense of the words—] that is

\* सच्चि वदार्थ एव वाक्यार्थः । वदस्य वदार्थेन सच्चि  
साम्यस्यैवा पदसमूहकृपवाक्यस्य वाक्यार्थेन सच्चि न चित्ति-  
साम्यस्यः क्षिप्तस्य एव । सच पुरुषकल्पितः लक्षितः कथं  
धर्मं प्रमाणमिति पूर्वपक्षस्यैवाभिप्रायः ॥

† सिद्धान्तमाह ।

the producer of [the knowledge of] the meaning [of the sentence].

a. 'Of those that are in it';—i. e. of those several words that are extant in these [sentences]; 'along with what signifies action';—i. e., along with a term that expresses power [—in other words, along with a verb—]; 'the sentence', i. e. the reading [or the employment] is observed, in [the texts which enjoin] the *Āgāthetra* sacrifice, &c. Hence the knowledge of the sense of a sentence—[knowledge] which we had not before [hearing or reading it]—comes only from a collection of words which involves a verb:—'because it is this that is the producer';—i. e. because of the fact that 'this'—viz. the knowledge of the meaning of the words, is the producer', or cause, thereof."

b. To explain:—In the injunction "He that desireth Paradise should celebrate the *Āgāthetra* sacrifice" (see *Āph.* 5. 3.), the knowledge of the meaning of the sentence—viz., that it is by the sacrifice called the *Āgāthetra* that one may secure Paradise,—does not take place unless there be present the meaning of the words [—viz., the words *Āgāthetra* and *Paradise*—]; but the knowledge of the meaning of the sentence just consists in the knowledge of the mutual relation, consistently, of the meanings

\* तद्वृत्तानां । तेषु श्रुतानां मध्येकपदानां । क्रियार्थेन ।  
 शक्तिवाचिना पदेन सह । समाख्यातः । पठनं । दृश्यते ।  
 अदिदोषाद्यर्थेषु । अतः क्रियावाचकपदपरिणयद्वयमूहा-  
 देशपूर्वा आत्मार्थग्रहः । स्वर्थस्तु । वाक्यार्थज्ञानस्तु । तद्वि-  
 निमज्जान् । तन् । पदार्थज्ञानं । विभिन्नं । कारणं यच्च ।  
 तज्ज्ञानम् ।

that arise before us from the words.\*—[so that if it be agreed that the meaning of the separate words is not dependent on man's contrivance, so neither is that of sentences formed out of such words;—and such additional difficulties as may seem to grow out of this view will be grappled with in the sequel].

## लोके सद्विषयात्मयोगसन्निकर्षः स्यात् ॥ २१ ॥

*As in secular matters, so in Scripture, the formation of sentences and expressions.* Aph. 25.—Since, in [the structure of] his language of] the world, there is a regular order,—[so in the Veda also] let there take place the employment [of language according to a fixed system to be learned through traditional instruction].

a. 'In the world'—i. e. in secular speech;—having discerned what is meant by the word,—or, with a previous knowledge of what is meant by the word,—'since there is a regular order' i. e. since there is an employment [of words according to a fixed system,—men not deriving phrases capriciously—so] in the Veda also, let there be—founded on knowledge derived from the traditional instruction of teachers,—the 'occurrence'—i. e. the taking place—of an employment of language [according to a fixed system].†

\* अग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात्स्वर्गकाम इत्यत्र अग्निहोत्रनामक-  
होत्रेन स्वर्गश्चाप्येदिति वाक्यार्थज्ञानं न पदार्थोपस्थिति-  
मन्तरा भवति किन्तु पदार्थोपस्थितानामर्थानां योग्यतया  
परस्परसम्बन्धज्ञानमेव वाक्यार्थज्ञानमिति भावः ।

† लोके । लौकिकवद्दे । पदार्थं इहा पदार्थज्ञानपूर्वकं ।

Again he [the author] ironically states that this [the Veda] is no authority in regard to duty, because [forsooth] it is not eternal, and it has been made by men, and men are liable to err.\*

## वेदादौ च सन्निकर्षं पुरुषाख्याः ॥ ९-७ ॥

*Objection to the eternity of the Vedas.* Aph. 37.—And the Vedas also they contain the names of men. some declare to be something recent, [because] there are the names of men [in it].

a. "The Vedas," Ac. 1.—i. e. since there are the names *Kāphala*, and *Kaṣṇa*, Ac., therefore it is "recent"—a matter of *now*—that is to say *beginning and a beginning*. "The Vedas"—i. e. the scriptures. "Recent"—i. e. the followers of the *Nyāya*. These [followers of the *Nyāya*] have asserted this,—such is the remainder [which requires to be supplied in order to complete the Aphorism].

सन्निकर्षमात् । प्रयोगात् । वेदेऽपि पुरुषरन्ध्ररथा ज्ञानपूर्वकः ।  
प्रयोगश्च सन्निकर्षः । उत्पत्तिः । स्मात् ।

\* वेदस्त्वनित्यत्वात् पौरुषेयत्वात् धर्मो न ज्ञानार्थं पुरुष-  
दोषसम्भवादिति पुनराश्रितम् ।

† वेदानिति । अतः पुरुषाख्याः । काठकं कौमरिति  
नामानि । अतः सन्निकर्षं । आधुनिकं । सादृश्यादर्थः ।  
वेदान् । आस्त्राद्यान् । एके । नैयायिकाः । आश्रयित्वेति  
शेषः ।

h. And for the following reason also [—if we are to listen to such objectors as the *Mātyasiṅgas*—] it [the *Veda*] is un-eternal—as the author [ironically] states.\*

### अनितादर्थेनाद्य । १८ ।

*Objection to the eternity of the *Veda* that they make mention of persons who must necessarily have been born*

*Aph. 28.—Because of our seeing un-eternal persons [mentioned in the *Vedas*].*

a. 'Un-eternal,' &c. Because, in such scriptures as "Babru, the son of Pruhgi, desired,"—"Kusurabinda, the son of Uddā-laki, desired,"—we see mention of 'un-eternal persons,' i. e. of persons to whom belonged birth and death; and these sentences did not exist before the birth of these persons; so that the un-eternity and the human origin [of the *Veda*] is established by the fact that it had a beginning.†

a. The author now mentions the established tract in regard to this.‡

### उक्तानु शब्दपूर्वत्वम् । १९ ।

*The eternity of the *Veda* re-asserted.*

*Aph. 29.—But there has been decided [already] the priority of Sound [to any point in time].*

\* इतोऽप्यनित्य इत्याह ।

† अनित्येति । अनित्यानी । जननमरश्चयतां । यमरः प्राहृष्टिरकामयत कुसुरबिन्दुः यौदासकिरकामयत इत्यादि-वेदेषु दर्शनात् । तेषाञ्जननप्रपञ्चिमानि वाक्यानि नाश-श्चिति वादितादनित्यत्वं यौगधेयत्वञ्च सिद्धम् ।

‡ सिद्धान्तमाह ।

a. 'But there has been declared,' &c. To supply the ellipse,—the priority [to any point in time], i. e. the eternity, of Sound has been established. The eternity of Sound being established, the eternity of the Veda also is declared in the aphorism:—such is the meaning.\*

### आध्या प्रवचनात् । ३० ।

*How eternity of the Veda comes to its name of after-eternity.*

Aph. 30.—The name [—derived from that of some mortal—was given, to this or that section of the Veda,] because of his reading it.

a. 'The name,'—i. e. the name of "the Kāṇḍaka section," [see Aph. 27. a.], or the like, is suitable 'because of his reading' or studying it,—the 'Kāṇḍaka section' being that which was perused by Kāṇḍa.†

### परन्तु क्षुतिमान्मान्यम् । ३१ ।

*What name is to be given of man, in the Veda, not really man.*

Aph. 31.—But the terms in the text [which seem to be names of man] are common [to other objects, and do not there designate man].

Although there is the name "Bahava" or "Prāśāngi" [in the Veda,—see Aph. 28. a.], yet the text—the word 'Prāśāngi' or the like—is 'common',—i. e. is expressive also of some other

\* उक्तमिति । शब्दे पूर्वत्वं नित्यत्वं साधितं प्रामिति शेषः । शब्दे नित्यत्वे सिद्धे वेदेऽपि नित्यत्वं शब्दे उक्तमित्यर्थः ।

† आध्या । काठकादिधर्माध्या । प्रवचनात् । आध्वयनात् । कठेनार्थेन काठकमित्युपपत्त्या ।



thing [than it may appear at first sight to denote]. For example—[in the word *Prakāśati*—] the prefix *pra* implies 'causes,'—the word *śal* signifies 'motion,'—the final *i* represents the agent; and thus the word signifies the *Wind* which moves very *fast*, and *śal* is without beginning; and [moreover] the word "*Brahm*" is a word indicative of the sound of the Wind,—so that there is not even a smell of inconsistency.\*

*Objection that the Veda contains portions of other sciences.*

§. But then how can it be instrumental in producing right knowledge in regard to Duty, when the Veda contains such incoherent prattle as the following:—*vi.* "Janakgana, in cloth dressed, standing at the door, is singing benedictions:—of him, a Brishmag-woman, desirous of a son, enquires,—'O Sir!—what is the meaning of this [which I hear you declaring] about intercourse on days of fasting?'"—or the following:—*vi.* "The cows also attend this sacrifice?"— To this he replies as follows:—

\* यशसि बभरः प्रावहविरित्यसि परन्तु क्षुतिः प्रावह-  
प्यादियन्तः सान्त्वयं । अन्वार्थस्यापि वाचकं । तथाहि ।  
द्वेयस्य हन्तायांशयः । वचनशब्दस्य गतिः । इकारः कर्त्ता ।  
तथाशेषोत्प्रेतगतावयः । वायुवरश्चानादिः । बभर इति वायु-  
शब्दानुकरशमिति नानुपपत्तिगम्योऽपि ।

† Or, according to another reading, "What is the meaning of prattle as regards the goddess *Dut*?"

‡ ननु जरद्वयः कम्बजपादुकाभ्यां दारि क्षितौ नात्यति  
महत्त्वमिति तं ब्राह्मणो दृष्ट्वति पुत्रकान्ता राजहमयां सम्-  
नस्य कोऽप्येदमिति वाचो वा एतच्च समागतोत्पादीनामशम्यह-  
प्रत्तापानां वेदे हन्तात् कथं स भर्त्तु प्रमाणमित्यवाह ॥

## कृते वा विनियोगः स्थात् कर्मव्यवस्थान्धात् । ३२ ।

*Phrases as "the action,"* &c., may be found, on examination, to have a meaning.

*Apk. 32.—11* [—the expression just charged with being incoherent—] may have an application to the action, through its really standing in relation to the action [which it serves suggestively to incite to as a duty].

a. 'To the action,' &c. :—that is to say :—even such an expression as "The cows also attend this sacrifice" [*Apk. 31. 4.*],— "through its standing in relation"—i. e. through its really involving a mutual reference to—"the action"—i. e. the passage requiring some action,—has 'an application'—viz. through the prelate\* [which it suggests as attending the performance of the action].

b. The import of the argument is this, viz.—Did the very heaves—the cows—engage in the sacrifice, or ought who were to engage in its performance?—the kindling of the doubt serves to commend† [that duty which even things senseless would engage in if men neglected it]—as we say, "The very stones would cry out" if men were to keep silence when under an imperative obligation to speak out].

c. So much for the first section of the first Book of the commentary on the *Aporisms of Jaimini* :

\* कृते इति । कर्मव्यवस्थाः कर्मव्यवस्थान्धात्कर्मव्यवस्थान्धात् । सम्बन्धात् । परस्परव्याख्यायितत्वात् । मानो वा इत्यादीनामपि । कृते । कर्मव्यवस्था । श्रुतिद्वारा विनियोगः ।

† अथवायथा । गवाहयो जहा अपि कर्मव्यवस्थान्धात्कर्मव्यवस्थान्धात् । किन्तु विद्यायोः श्रुतिद्वारा विनियोगः संकल्प इति श्रुतौ तात्पर्यं युवदिति ।

‡ इति जैमिनिस्वरूपेण प्रथमाध्यायस्य अन्तः ।



